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Nietzsche’s intuitions
Justin Remhof
Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
ABSTRACT
This essay examines a particular rhetorical strategy Nietzsche uses to supply
prima facie epistemic justiﬁcation: appeals to intuition. I ﬁrst investigate what
Nietzsche thinks intuitions are, given that he never uses the term ‘intuition’ as
we do in contemporary philosophy. I then examine how Nietzsche can
simultaneously endorse naturalism and intuitive appeals. I ﬁnish by looking at
why and how Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition to further his philosophical
agenda. Answering these questions should provide a new and deeper
understanding of how Nietzsche does philosophy.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 26 March 2019; Accepted 3 September 2019
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This article explores a new way of understanding how Nietzsche does phil-
osophy: he appeals to the intuitions of his readers. At ﬁrst glance, this view
might seem strange. After all, much of Nietzsche’s work aims to undermine
the legitimacy of positions that philosophers have long thought to be
intuitive.1 But I argue that Nietzsche embraces appeals to intuition. Such
appeals are meant to give readers reason to accept positions that he
believes are true. Thus, perhaps much to the surprise of many readers, I
hold that Nietzsche thinks intuitions can have justiﬁcatory force.
My view falls between two very diﬀerent readings of Nietzsche’s meth-
odology that have recently dominated the literature. One approach
focuses on Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism, the view that philosophi-
cal positions should be, in some sense, continuous with the sciences.2 On
this account, one of Nietzsche’s primary goals is justifying positions by
appeal to what can be supported by the sciences, broadly conceived.3
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1With respect to moral philosophy, for example, see Katsafanas (2016, 26–28, 35); Owen (2007, 5, 146).
2For various accounts of Nietzsche’s naturalism, see Leiter (2002, 2013); Schacht (2012); Acampora (2006,
2013); Clark and Dudrick (2006, 2012).
3For instance, Leiter writes, ‘Any method that reliably produces knowledge of what is true is aWissenschaft
[viz, a science, broadly construed to include the humanities]’ (Leiter 2019a, 93, my brackets). A diﬀerent
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The other approach to Nietzsche’s methodology stresses his use of rhetori-
cal devices likemetaphor, hyperbole, humor, sarcasm, and parable – devices
meant to provoke aﬀective reactions like shock, awe, and admiration, which
eﬀectively bypass ‘rational judgment’ (Janaway 2009, 252).4 The two
approaches are globally incompatible, but locally compatible. If there
were clearly demarcated domains within which Nietzsche justiﬁes his
claims naturalistically which could be separated from domains in which jus-
tiﬁcation is beside the point, then Nietzsche could employ the method that
best ﬁts the subject matter. But he oﬀers no such demarcation.5 And com-
mentators see no problem with this, since both approaches to Nietzsche’s
methodology agree about which method provides epistemic justiﬁcation,
that is, justiﬁcation conducive to delivering truth and avoiding error. The
naturalist approach holds that naturalism supplies justiﬁcation, and the
rhetorical approach holds that rhetoric is simply not in the game of
providing justiﬁcation. As a result, the two camps agree that Nietzsche’s
rhetorical style does not provide warrant. I disagree – I contend that there
are instances where Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategies supply justiﬁcation.6
One such strategy, I suggest, involves appealing to the intuitions of his
readers.7 Roughly, intuitions involve something seeming true, such as the
claim that there are no round squares, or that torturing a puppy is
wrong. Both historically and today some of the most challenging objec-
tions to philosophical naturalism come from appeals to intuition.
Whereas scientists test their theories against the ﬁndings of observation
and experiment, it is not uncommon to ﬁnd philosophers oﬀering justiﬁ-
cation by pointing to intuition. We should expect that Nietzsche’s prefer-
ence for naturalism would then lead him to reject appeals to intuition.
view is oﬀered by Clark and Dudrick (2006, 2012). They hold that for Nietzsche justiﬁcation occurs with
the realm of human behavior, or the ‘space of reasons’, rather than the realm of merely empirical
phenomena, or the ‘space of causes’, which is studied by the sciences. My account diﬀers from Clark
and Dudrick’s in that they do not discuss how Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategies might supply justiﬁcation
in the space of reasons.
4Janaway (2009) and Gemes (2006) oﬀer inﬂuential accounts of this approach.
5It might be desirable if the two approaches could be shown to be globally compatible, despite ﬁrst
appearances, since this demarcation strategy raises many obvious problems. For instance, we might
wonder how to draw the boundaries, how to explain why justiﬁcation is or is not pertinent, and why
the non-justiﬁcatory domain is still philosophically important.
6In what follows, I use ‘justiﬁcation’, ‘warrant’, and ‘reason to believe’ interchangeably, and I count ‘S has
reason to believe X’ and ‘S has reason not to believe X’ both as instances of providing genuine
justiﬁcation.
7This paper concerns philosophical appeals to intuition in general, rather than Nietzsche’s technical use of
the term ‘intuition’ [Anschauung], which he contrasts with ‘intellect’ [Intellekt] in ‘On Truth and Lies in a
Non-Moral Sense’. For discussion of Nietzsche’s speciﬁc use term ‘intuition’, see Church (2015, 88).
Appeals to intuition have been around in philosophy for a long time, though of course not in name,
and my aim here is to understand why and how Nietzsche appeals to what we now understand as
appeals to intuition.
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And to some extent, we see below, this is true. But at the same time,
although Nietzsche never uses the term ‘intuition’ as we do in contempor-
ary philosophy, his writing style often leads readers intuitively to prefer
some position over another, and such intuitive appeal seems to rationalize
philosophical positions he believes are correct. Thus, it appears that intui-
tions occupy some important middle-ground between naturalistic and
rhetorical approaches to Nietzsche’s methodology.
We are then faced with three important questions, none of which have
been addressed in the literature. First, what might Nietzsche think intui-
tions are? When he invites readers to favor something intuitively, for
instance, does he appeal to beliefs, emotional states, sui generis prop-
ositional attitudes, some combination of these, or what? Second, how
might Nietzsche simultaneously endorse naturalism and appeals to intui-
tion, especially if naturalism has a monopoly on justiﬁcation? Third, how
are Nietzsche’s appeals to intuition meant to further his philosophical
agenda? This paper aims to make headway on these questions in order
to better understand how Nietzsche does philosophy.
Intuitions as presentational states
When Nietzsche appeals to intuition, I propose, he appeals to what con-
temporary thinkers refer to as presentationalmental states, and he believes
that such states are typically manifest in aﬀective responses.8 In this
section, I describe some key features of presentational states. In the follow-
ing sections, I show how these features come alive in Nietzsche’s texts.
Presentational states, which can be identiﬁed with intuitive states in
general, but need not be, are a particular kind of representational state.9
Representational states represent the world as being a certain way if
their content were true. Such states are also presentational if they do
not simply represent the world as being a certain way, but also present
the world as being that way. For example, consider a visual experience.
When we look at an orange on a table, we have the visual representational
state that the world is such a way where it is true that there is an orange on
8For Nietzsche, aﬀective states can be conscious or unconscious, but in what follows I only discuss con-
scious aﬀective states. Although appeals to intuition could certainly aﬀect us unconsciously, having
an intuition – for example, the intuition that God’s death is frighteningly disorienting – is often a con-
scious experience. I also focus on intuitions that actually manifest in aﬀective reactions, despite the fact
that Nietzsche does not seem to believe that intuitions necessarily manifest aﬀectively. This will help us
understand the relation between drives and intuitions.
9What follows is indebted to Bengson (2015). One major diﬀerence between Nietzsche and Bengson’s
accounts is that Bengson, but not Nietzsche, believes presentational states can provide suﬃcient justiﬁ-
cation, speciﬁcally justiﬁcation that does not require justiﬁcation in turn – akin to something ‘given’.
Nietzsche would reject this rationalist view.
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the table. But, in having this experience, we do not merely represent to
ourselves that particular state of aﬀairs, as someone who might stand
back and look upon their own mental states. Instead, we have the immedi-
ate impression that there is an orange on the table, in the sense that we
seem directly inﬂuenced by the orange’s presence. The orange impresses
itself on our visual experience. Presentational states, whether perceptual
or involving propositional attitudes, involve some way in which the
world is immediately presented to us.
Importantly, although intuitions are sometimes regarded as beliefs,10
beliefs and presentational states are not identical. When believing some-
thing, the content of the belief is often endorsed, or accepted as true.
To believe that it is raining outside is to accept that it is true that it is
raining outside. But to be presented something is merely to have the
impression that it is true. I believe the Earth is spinning approximately
1,000 MPH, for instance, but I have no impression of this. When viewing
the Müller-Lyer illusion, I have the impression that the two lines have
diﬀerent lengths, but I do not believe it.
Beliefs also often have explicit propositional content. Typically, the
content of a belief can be articulated fully, or formulated explicitly,
despite the fact that some beliefs might be quite simple and others
more complicated. The propositional contents of a belief can often be
stated clearly and openly – the content is fully available to the subject
holding the belief. In contrast, while the propositional content of presen-
tational states can be explicit, such content is oftentimes implicit. That is,
one might have an impression about something without being able to
explicitly formulate the propositional content of that impression. The
content might not yet be clear to the subject having the impression, or
not yet consciously available.11 This does not imply that implicit content
is nonconceptual, of course. Nothing about the implicit nature of prop-
ositional content implies that such content only involves concepts, speciﬁ-
cally concepts one possesses to represent the world. Implicit content is
simply content that is not fully articulated, unlike the typical content of
beliefs.
On Nietzsche’s account, I argue below, intuitive states are typically pre-
sentational states, speciﬁcally states manifest in aﬀective reactions.12
10See, e.g. Lewis (1983, x); Gopnik and Schwitzgebel (1998); Devitt (2006, 491); Kornblith (1998).
11For further explanation, see Bengson (2015, section 4). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me
to be clear about these ideas.
12This appears unique to Nietzsche. Intuitions are often thought to be beliefs, dispositions to believe, or sui
generis propositional attitudes, none of which typically involve aﬀective states. For a helpful discussion
of these competing ways to understand intuitions, see Pust (2017, section 1).
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Broadly, aﬀective reactions are psychological states involving feelings, like
shock or awe. Just as presentations and beliefs come apart, so too with
presentations and aﬀective responses. Presentational states need not
manifest aﬀectively. For instance, the impression that not both p and
not-p can be true need not involve anything aﬀective. And, arguably,
aﬀective states need not immediately present the world as being some
way or another. Sometimes feelings of severe depression, for example,
can be extremely overwhelming and do not necessarily appear to
involve anything identiﬁably representational. And even if aﬀective
states involve representational states, psychologists and philosophers of
emotion commonly hold that feelings involve beliefs, and we have seen
that presentational states and beliefs should be diﬀerentiated. So, presen-
tational states are not simply beliefs with aﬀective ﬂare.
As I see things, Nietzsche thinks that appeals to intuition can do some
serious philosophical work, especially because intuitions have this
aﬀective component. To show that this is the case, however, we ﬁrst
need to carve out a space for such work to get oﬀ the ground. This
brings us to the relation between naturalism and intuition.
Intuition, science, and drives
Intuitions are sometimes thought to justify philosophical positions. But, as
we saw above, commentators commonly think that for Nietzsche justiﬁca-
tion is supplied by naturalistic accounts of the world. So, does Nietzsche’s
naturalism eclipse the justiﬁcatory work that appeals to intuitions might
do?
To begin, there is good reason to believe that Nietzsche endorses nat-
uralism. He asks, ‘When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us?
When will we have completely de-deiﬁed nature? When may we begin to
naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed
nature?’ (GS 109). A naturalistic justiﬁcation is one that, at least in part,
can be conﬁrmed in experience, and science is in the business of providing
such justiﬁcation. For Nietzsche science is the ‘wisdom of the world’ (A 47).
But this praise comes with an important qualiﬁcation. Nietzsche holds that
‘there is no science “without presuppositions”’ (GS 344). Science ‘ﬁrst
needs an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it
could believe in itself’ (GM III: 25). The speciﬁc presupposition or ideal of
value that Nietzsche believes that science accepts or should accept does
not concern us here. What is signiﬁcant is that for Nietzsche science
does not oﬀer theory-independent justiﬁcation.
INQUIRY 5
A theory-independent justiﬁcation is one not assumed by virtue of prior
or continuing commitments to any substantive philosophical theory.
Theory-independent reasons do not merely reinforce previous or
ongoing philosophical commitments. For Nietzsche commitment to
science requires making certain assumptions about the nature of scientiﬁc
practice, from the aims to the methods of inquiry, which inform naturalistic
justiﬁcation. This does not lead Nietzsche to reject naturalism, of course.
He simply thinks that naturalistic justiﬁcation is not theory-independent.
Nietzsche’s praise of naturalism together with his rejection of theory-
independent warrant suggests that, as a general rule, he believes that if
something constitutes a suitable justiﬁcation then it will somehow be
theory-dependent. So, if intuitions can supply warrant then it will not be
due to their theory-independent character. The problem is that intuitions
are often thought to be exactly that. Many philosophers, especially those
aﬃliated with the rationalist tradition, believe that intuitions supply
reason to support positions regardless of antecedent normative commit-
ments. Perhaps this is for good reason. For instance, it seems intuitively
true that nothing can be all red and all green simultaneously. Intuitions
like these appear to supply direct evidence on purely rational grounds,
with no need to appeal to anything derived from any experience
outside what is required to grasp the relevant concepts in play. For this
reason, philosophers have taken intuitions to provide a priori warrant,
which is classically considered to be theory-independent.13
Nietzsche rejects theory-independent justiﬁcation, a priori or otherwise.
Consider the attack he launches on moral philosophers in BGE 186:14
all our philosophers demanded something far more exalted, presumptuous, and
solemn from themselves as soon as they approached the study of morality: they
wanted to supply a rational foundation for morality […] What the philosophers
called “a rational foundation for morality” and tried to supply was, seen in the
right light, merely a scholarly variation of the common faith in the prevalent
morality; a new means of expression for this faith; and thus just another fact
within a particular morality.
According to Nietzsche, moral philosophers like Kant and Schopenhauer
have attempted to supply a ‘rational foundation for morality’. Such justiﬁ-
cation, which includes a priori warrant, is supposed to stand apart from
13For discussion, see BonJour (2011).
14I use BGE 186, which concerns moral philosophy, as just one example of the way in which Nietzsche
rejects theory-independent justiﬁcation, but there is good reason to think that rejecting views on
these grounds extends to other domains of philosophy. For defense of this view, see Katsafanas
(forthcoming).
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contingent contextual factors that might inﬂuence philosophers to
embrace some theory or another, including, Nietzsche writes, ‘their
environment, their class, their church, the spirit of their time, [and] their
climate and part of the world’ (BGE 186). It is then reasonable to
suppose that a rational justiﬁcation is theory-independent. A predominant
source of such justiﬁcation in moral philosophy comes from intuitive data.
It is common to test the plausibility of moral theories by appeal to intui-
tion, and moral theories often gain justiﬁcation by being intuitively plaus-
ible.15 In BGE 186, Nietzsche suggests that such appeals to intuition merely
provide support for views philosophers already embrace, and therefore do
no genuine justiﬁcatory work.16
On Nietzsche’s view, then, those who embrace strategies like intuitive
appeals presume to know the truth and have no desire to call that truth
into question. Those who oﬀer intuitive justiﬁcation for their preferred
moral theories merely oﬀer a ‘scholarly variation of the common faith in
the prevalent morality’ (BGE 186). Intuition, therefore, far from providing
theory-independent warrant, amounts to what Nietzsche calls ‘conviction’,
or ‘the belief that on some particular point of knowledge one is in posses-
sion of the unqualiﬁed truth’ (HH I: 630). Nietzsche rejects conviction on
the grounds that those who ﬁx belief by way of conviction close them-
selves oﬀ to questions, experiments, and alternative positions, all of
which are conducive to the pursuit of truth. As a result, ‘convictions are
more dangerous enemies of truth than lies’ (HH I: 483)
Nietzsche appeals to science in order to challenge conviction. He says
that in science ‘convictions have no rights of citizenship’ (GS 344, see
also HH I: 630). Nietzsche primarily champions science for its method,
rather than its particular results: ‘the scientiﬁc spirit rests upon an
insight into methods, and if those methods were lost, then all the
results of science could not prevent a restoration of superstition and non-
sense’ (HH I: 635, my translation, cf. A 59). In addition to oﬀering ‘rigorous
procedures of inquiry’ (HH I: 633), which involves creating and testing
hypotheses, Nietzsche believes the scientiﬁc method involves a critical
attitudinal stance characterized by exhibiting ‘cautious reserve’ (HH I:
15Indeed, in the preface to the Groundwork Kant famously claims that his moral theory will be supported
by ‘common cognition’, or our ordinary, intuitive judgments concerning morality.
16Owen is right to say that, on Nietzsche’s account, our ‘moral intuitions’ are ‘the product of the particular
contingent course of European history’ (Owen 2007, 5; see also Katsafanas 2016, 26–28). Owen later
claims that this contingency ‘encourages a degree of scepticism towards forms of argument based
on any straightforward appeal to our intuitions’ (Owen 2007, 146). But, as I argue below, Nietzsche
repeatedly appeals to intuition in GM, though of course nothing ‘straightforwardly’ turns such
appeals. Owen dedicates a section of his book on GM to understanding Nietzsche’s rhetoric and, unfor-
tunately, does not mention Nietzsche’s strategy of appealing to intuition.
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631, cf. A 59), ‘wise moderation’ (HH I: 631), and ‘instinctive mistrust of
devious thinking’ (HH I: 635, see also 633; A 13; GS 344). Fixing belief by
way of the scientiﬁc method opposes conviction because those who
embrace the scientiﬁc method exhibit the desire to question, experiment,
and consider alternative positions.17 The scientiﬁc method is better suited
to delivering truth and avoiding error. To be sure, Nietzsche does argue
that certain convictions are often operative in scientiﬁc work, such as
the conviction that truth is more valuable than other modes of evaluation
(see, e.g., GM III: 24; GS 344; BGE 1). Nietzsche therefore suggests that we
should experimentally call the value of truth into question, a project which
is perfectly consistent with the method of questioning, experimentation,
and exploring alternative positions.
Since Nietzsche contrasts science with conviction and suggests that
appeals to intuition merely amount to convictions, we should expect
him to dismiss appeals to intuition as being unscientiﬁc. And that seems
to be exactly what is going on in BGE 186. ‘What the philosophers
called “a rational foundation for morality”’, he says, was ‘certainly the
very opposite of an examination, analysis, questioning, and vivisection
of this very faith [in prevalent forms of morality]’. Finding a theory-inde-
pendent justiﬁcation for morality, perhaps through intuitive warrant,
runs counter to the scientiﬁc method. Nietzsche seems to be pitting
appeals to intuition against the scientiﬁc method and clearly siding with
science.
This is not the end of the matter, however. If we remember that
Nietzsche simultaneously praises science and rejects theory-independent
justiﬁcation by scientiﬁc means, we see that there is ample room for him to
embrace a positive conception of intuition, and even for appeals to intui-
tion to provide some kind of justiﬁcation. As I see things, Nietzsche
endorses a view of intuition that falls between thin and thick conceptions
of intuition.
A thin conception of intuition holds that intuitions are theory-indepen-
dent because they are a priori. Nietzsche’s commitment to naturalism
strongly indicates that he rejects a priori justiﬁcation. But intuitions need
not be a priori. For instance, many of our intuitions, say, about moral
cases, are derived from a familiarity with various theories culled from
experience together with an understanding of the consequences of imple-
menting those theories in real-world scenarios. Our intuitions often bring
17Nietzsche’s understanding of the scientiﬁc method, and his preference for the scientiﬁc method over
conviction, is very similar to Peirce’s position in his inﬂuential essay ‘The Fixation of Belief’. See
Peirce (1982, 61–78).
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empirical information to bear on test cases. And, I contend, appeals to
intuition can be considered theory-independent without being so inde-
pendent of philosophical theories that they are thought to provide a
priori warrant. Such appeals rely on antecedent information derived
from experience but remain open to revision given new experience.
A thick conception of intuition holds that intuitions are theory-depen-
dent in that they merely reinforce prior or ongoing philosophical commit-
ments. This conception of intuition also need not be true. For instance,
appeals to intuition based on our experience of the world can be used
to question the plausibility of previously held beliefs, such as, for
example, the longstanding view that knowledge is true justiﬁed belief.
Intuitions can provide prima facie reason to consider positions that diﬀer
from those that might have once been well-received. In response to
Gettier cases, for instance, we ﬁnd an entire literature proposing new
accounts of what constitutes knowledge – reliabilist theories, causal the-
ories, and so on. This suggests that intuitions can be considered theory-
dependent without being so dependent on theories that they are
thought not to provide independent sources of warrant.
The conceptual space for Nietzsche to embrace a positive view of intui-
tion now emerges. Insofar as appeals to intuition can provide prima facie
support for some position without merely indicating antecedent commit-
ment to that position, and insofar as that prima facie support is not a priori
but is instead dependent on prior experience and revisable upon future
experience, it seems that appeals to intuition are perfectly consistent
with Nietzsche’s emphasis on ﬁxing belief by way of the scientiﬁc
method. This renders intuitive appeals consistent with his naturalism.
Below I give examples of how these kinds of appeals are very much
present in Nietzsche’s texts, and how such appeals have important justiﬁ-
catory roles to play in Nietzsche’s philosophy. But ﬁrst let me turn to an
important objection.
There is reason to believe that Nietzsche thinks intuitions are hopelessly
thick. Intuitions cannot provide theory-independent support, one might
argue, because they are irrevocably intertwined with substantive philoso-
phical theories. In BGE 6, for example, Nietzsche writes, ‘every great phil-
osophy so far has been […] the personal confession of its author and a
kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir’. Philosophies are ‘confes-
sions’ of the philosopher because they reﬂect the philosopher’s ‘basic
drives’ (BGE 6). On Nietzsche’s account, human beings are constituted
by a particular rank order of drives, which, very generally, ground disposi-
tions to think, feel, and act. Rank order is determined by dominant and
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subordinate relations between drives, and the strongest drives have the
greatest inﬂuence on how we think, feel, and act. The point of BGE 6
seems to be that dominant drives are ultimately responsible for our philo-
sophical commitments. If so, then it appears that any use of intuition
would ultimately only support one’s prior or continuing philosophical
commitments. Not only does this seem to wipe out any possibility that
appeals to intuition can be theory-independent, it also seems to under-
mine the justiﬁcatory work of appeals to intuition in general, on the
grounds that intuitions cannot warrant positions while genuinely remain-
ing open to challenge from conﬂicting viewpoints.
Nonetheless, I think Nietzsche can embrace the theory-dependent
nature of intuitions and still claim that intuitions have important prima
facie justiﬁcatory work to do. The fact that intuitions are ultimately
grounded in our drives does not entail that intuitions cannot provide inde-
pendent support for some view over another while also remaining open to
challenge fromwithout. When we have certain intuitions, Nietzsche thinks,
we can to some extent become aware of the drives which dispose us to
have those intuitions, and we can utilize that awareness to assess the
credibility of what we are driven to ﬁnd intuitive. This process can push
us to examine, analyze, and question what we ﬁnd intuitive, which can
in turn motivate us to ﬁnd independent support for some position over
another, that is, justiﬁcation not presupposed in initially ﬁnding some pos-
ition intuitive. Here it is crucial to remember that for Nietzsche intuitive
appeals are aﬀectively loaded, since aﬀective reactions can help reveal
the nature of our drives. As Katsafanas writes, ‘drives manifest themselves
by generating aﬀective orientations’ (2016, 104). Aﬀective reactions that
manifest with presentational states, which, on my reading, can provide
prima facie reason to accept some claim as true or false, can also give us
reason to interrogate what we are initially driven to ﬁnd intuitive. We
can see how this works by turning to Nietzsche’s account of the death
of God.
Intuition, the death of god, and nobility
To illustrate Nietzsche’s view of intuitions as presentational states, and to
see how he construes the relation between intuitions and drives, consider
an excerpt from the famous ‘God is dead’ passage:
“Where is God?” [the Madman] cried, “I’ll tell you!We have killed him—you and I!
We are all his murderers. But how did we do this? How were we able to drink up
the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were
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we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is it moving to
now? Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually
falling? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an
up and a down? Aren’t we straying as though through an inﬁnite nothing?
Isn’t empty space breathing at us? Hasn’t it gotten colder? Isn’t night and
more night coming again and again?” (GS 125)
And Nietzsche continues – in fact, he asks sixteen consecutive questions!
Notice that questions do not contain explicit – speciﬁcally, assertive – prop-
ositional content. Nietzsche does not tell readers what to believe, or what
is true or false. Instead, readers are invited to have certain impressions
about the loss of Godmanifest in aﬀective reactions to his barrage of ques-
tions. Nietzsche invites readers to have a disorienting aﬀective reaction to
his many questions.18 Unchaining the earth from the sun, moving away
from all suns, falling without direction – these all express states of disorien-
tation. Such disorientation is supposed to be terrifying. God’s death brings
about the feeling of moving through an inﬁnite nothingness, being con-
sumed by empty space, adrift in cold darkness. This gripping feeling
involves implicit propositional content, namely, that when God becomes
unbelievable, life loses direction. Importantly, Nietzsche never fully articu-
lates this reason to readers. The content is meant to be implicitly trans-
mitted through feelings of disorientation. The aﬀective impression of
disorientation then involves a terrifying loss of direction and contains an
implicit reason for that loss. This presents a nice example of how Nietzsche
appeals to intuition.19
This passage also shows that appeals to intuition can reveal the nature
of our drives and lead us to secure justiﬁcation for positions we are not
originally driven to believe. GS 125 addresses modern atheists. Atheists
are of course driven not to believe in the existence of God. Nietzsche
thinks they are also typically driven by commitments to traditional
moral principles, such as the principle that all people are morally equal,
or the principle that moral actions are selﬂess actions. To the modern
atheist, these principles are justiﬁed independently of the belief that
God exists. But Nietzsche holds that such principles are actually grounded
in the Judeo-Christian worldview. Since capacities and abilities are vastly
unequal across people and groups of people, it seems that only God
18This terminology comes from Reginster (2006, 26–27).
19One might argue that for Nietzsche the propositional content of our intuitions must be explicit rather
than implicit, since conscious content is necessarily conceptualized, and conceptualized content is
fully articulated. But, as we see here in GS 125, Nietzsche does not necessarily link conceptual
content with fully articulated content. Conceptual content can be implicit.
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can ensure that we are morally equal,20 and selﬂessness arguably becomes
a value only after people begin to rally behind giving themselves fully to
God. Nietzsche ultimately wants to encourage modern atheists to reject
these implicit endorsements of theism.
To achieve this aim, I suggest, Nietzsche appeals to intuition. He looks to
provoke certain impressions about the loss of God in order to motivate
atheists to inquire about the justiﬁcation of their commitments that
might depend on God, speciﬁcally their commitment to traditional
moral principles. Here is how this might work. GS 125 is meant to shock
atheists into having a certain presentational state about God’s death, an
impression that their drives typically blind them from having. The
impression involves terrifying disorientation with the implicit content
that belief in God actually provides direction for their lives. But at the
close of the passage, Nietzsche suggests that atheists do not explicitly
grasp this idea: ‘This deed [the death of God] is still more remote to
them than the remotest stars – and yet they have done it themselves!’
Nietzsche wants to remove this remoteness by motivating atheists to
seek out possible reasons for why they have the intuition that God gives
their lives direction. Upon having certain intuitions about the God’s
death, for instance, atheists might explore their reactions and come to
understand that their drive to embrace traditional moral principles
involves hidden commitments to theism. The impression that God’s
death is disorienting, together with the revelatory justiﬁcation that God
actually guides the lives of atheists, should motivate self-proclaimed athe-
ists to purge their lives of theism. To be sure, it need not go this way. For
instance, certain atheists might be motivated simply to ignore the feeling
of disorientation and avoid attempting to fully articulate and assess the
implicit content associated with that feeling. But Nietzsche clearly
attempts to use intuition in order to get modern atheists to overcome
these diﬃculties.21
If Nietzsche’s use of intuition in GS 125 is successful, atheists should be
moved to examine, analyze, and question a select set of their drives after
having prima facie reason to accept that belief in God continues to provide
20For a detailed discussion of this point, see Leiter (2019b).
21One might argue that Nietzsche’s account fails to distinguish practical from theoretical reason, such that
what we have reason to do should be separated from what we should believe. It might be further
argued that practical reason does not provide genuine justiﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, what we
should believe, all things considered, could be considered more important that our reasons for being
pushed merely to act in some way or another. In response, Nietzsche does not follow those who like
Aristotle who separate practical from theoretical reason and prefer the latter, and, on my account, he
believes practical reason can provide prima facie justiﬁcation to seek out the best theoretical reasons
for embracing some position or another.
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them with direction. This provides atheists with reason to seek out inde-
pendent justiﬁcation for their commitments after scrutinizing what they
are driven to ﬁnd intuitive. For example, they might be motivated to
seek out warrant for egalitarianism that in no way relies on God. GS 125
therefore illustrates how Nietzsche appeals to the intuitions of certain
groups of people in order to help them understand the nature of their
drives and invite them to critically analyze what they are driven to believe.
We can now see that the fact that intuitions are grounded in our drives
does not provide a good reason for supposing that appeals to intuition
cannot be helpful for coming to ﬁx belief. In fact, the view that intuitions
are grounded in our drives provides fodder for Nietzsche to appeal to
intuitions that run against what we are driven to believe. This is crucial
for pushing people to change their beliefs. Nietzsche is not merely inter-
ested in providing prima facie support for some position over another –
he wants to harness that support to elicit change. The attempt to
change peoples’ beliefs, I suggest, is the primary reason Nietzsche
appeals to intuition, and providing prima facie justiﬁcation is meant to
jumpstart that change. To further explore this idea, let us look at
another place in Nietzsche’s corpus where he utilizes the strategy of
appealing to the intuitions of his readers.
One of Nietzsche’s most striking and sustained appeals to intuition
comes in the ﬁrst essay of GM. It is commonly held that the ﬁrst essay
of GM is meant to change the beliefs of modern atheists, speciﬁcally
those who are unaware that their commitments concerning morality are
actually grounded in the Judeo-Christian worldview. One way that
Nietzsche attempts to achieve this aim is by providing contemporary
atheist readers with reason for ﬁnding the noble mode of valuation attrac-
tive. And Nietzsche attempts to accomplish this goal, at least in part, by
employing strategies that provoke the intuitions such atheists.
Since I cannot provide a thorough examination of Nietzsche’s complex
description of nobility in the ﬁrst essay of GM, consider just a few colorful
passages from GM I: 10. Nietzsche writes that ‘every noble morality devel-
ops from a triumphant aﬃrmation of itself’. ‘The noble mode of valuation’,
he proclaims, ‘acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its opposite only so as
to aﬃrm itself more gratefully and triumphantly’. Nobility is ‘ﬁlled with life
and passion through and through – “we noble ones, we good, beautiful,
happy ones!”’ He writes, ‘The noble man lives in trust and openness with
himself’. And the nobles have ‘strong, full natures’ with ‘an excess of the
power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget’. No reader can
easily brush oﬀ the attractiveness of nobility that Nietzsche presents here.
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The strongest pushback to ﬁnding nobility attractive occurs in GM I:
11,22 where Nietzsche describes the horriﬁc acts of the nobles when
they remove themselves from social constraints between themselves
and engage with those outside the group. He writes that ‘once they go
outside, where the strange, the stranger is found, they are not much
better than uncaged beasts of prey’. The nobles enact a ‘disgusting proces-
sion of murder, arson, rape, and torture’. It seems that contemporary athe-
ists, who typically embrace traditional morality, should ﬁnd these actions,
at the very least, signiﬁcantly unappealing. So, how does Nietzsche make
such ‘monsters’ attractive to us?
A closer look at GM I: 11 is revealing: Nietzsche’s phrasing, framing, and
presentation style consistently advance the appeal of nobility.23 He opens
the discussion by saying that ‘in their relations with one another’ nobles
‘show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy,
loyalty, pride, and friendship’. The nobles exhibit ‘mores, respect,
custom, gratitude’ [Sitte, Verehrung, Brauch, Dankbarkeit] (my translation).
Returning to the slave class expresses ‘freedom’ from ‘tension engendered
by protracted conﬁnement and enclosure’ in society. The seemingly
horriﬁc acts of the nobles show an ‘innocent conscience’. And the
nobles emerge from their recess ‘exhilarated and undisturbed of soul’.
At the close of the discussion the nobles are even described as ‘trium-
phant’ and ‘splendid’ beasts, those who are ‘avidly in search of spoil and
victory’. The seemingly negative actions Nietzsche attributes to nobility,
then, are regularly contextualized, qualiﬁed, and ﬂanked by positive
descriptors, and the discussion is even framed to open and close with posi-
tives. These details, I think, speak volumes: the nobles never truly lose their
appeal.24
22There might be another way to push back. Nietzsche seems to respect the intelligence of the slaves and
dismiss the nobles as unintelligent. This is a standard reading. For just a few clear examples, see Ridley
(1998, 127–134); Welshon (2014, 20–22); Hatab (2011, 207–213). Nietzsche writes, ‘A race of such men of
ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to
a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the ﬁrst importance’ (GM I: 10). I am not
convinced that this undermines the intuitive appeal of nobility. First, the passage continues by describ-
ing nobility in strongly positive terms. Second, Nietzsche holds that the slave’s cleverness develops from
dishonesty, and he praises the honesty of nobility. Third, Nietzsche thinks the cleverness of the slaves
plunges humanity into nihilism (see GM I: 12). As I see things, then, cleverness does not render the
slave class appealing.
23For a similar reading – and one that provides much more depth than my description here – see Migotti
(unpublished manuscript).
24I therefore disagree with White’s claim that ‘Nietzsche deliberately destroys the possibility of identiﬁ-
cation with [the noble master], by stressing his most horrible aspects as a murderous “beast of prey”’
(White 1994, 66), and Janaway’s claim that ‘Readers will be indignant about the nobles as Nietzsche
describes them’ (Janaway 2009, 100). Hatab (2008, 48–49) suggests that the negative remarks directed
at nobility in GM I: 11 come from the perspective of the slave, rather than Nietzsche’s own perspective. If
so, this supports my reading of Nietzsche’s positive depiction of the nobles, since the positive
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Moreover – and perhaps to put the ﬁnal nail in the coﬃn – Nietzsche
ends GM I: 11 by saying that while one may be warranted in being
afraid of the nobles, such fear is much more attractive than embracing
the slave mode of existence:
One may be quite justiﬁed in continuing to fear the blond beast at the core of all
noble races and in being on one’s guard against it: but who would not a hundred
times sooner fear where one can also admire than not fear but be permanently
condemned to the repellent sight of the ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and
poised?
The rhetoric clearly supports the nobles. The nobles are presented as
admirable, whereas the sickly features of the slave class exemplify ‘the
regression of mankind’. Nietzsche ﬁnishes the passage by unabashedly
denouncing the slaves, a move which simultaneously invites praise of
nobility. For example, he uses scare-quotes when referring to the slaves
as men – dismissing their humanity – and attacks them as ‘insipid’ and
‘maggots’. There should be no doubt that Nietzsche wants readers to
have the impression that nobility is appealing.25
Notice that none of these passages explicitly argue for, or endorse, the
superiority of nobility. The attractiveness of the noble mode of valuation
cannot be derived by appeal to traditional argument. And although
Nietzsche’s descriptions are aﬀectively-loaded, they are not merely rhetori-
cal – they seem to reﬂect what he holds true. Nietzsche invites readers to
have certain positive impressions about nobility manifest in aﬀective reac-
tions like attraction which provide prima facie reason to accept the view
that the noble mode of valuation should be preferred over slave mode
descriptions are clear in other passages. But it is hard to reconcile Hatab’s reading with the wealth of
positive descriptions used for nobility in GM I: 11, since these are descriptions that the slaves would
clearly not bother making. One might also argue that contemporary readers cannot genuinely grasp
the appeal of nobility because we are far removed from those cultures in which nobility ﬂourished –
we cannot ‘go back’, and of course Nietzsche never advocates for a return to the noble way of life.
But, as Migotti writes, Nietzsche never suggests that the perspective of nobility is ‘epistemically unavail-
able’ (Migotti 2006, 111). Migotti continues: ‘Noble values are not so bizarre as to render it doubtful that
we can understand what it might have been like to live in accordance with them’ (Migotti 2006, 111).
This understanding certainly informs the appeal of nobility for current readers.
25Commentators tend to signiﬁcantly underestimate the intuitive appeal of the nobles. Here are just a few
examples. Ridley writes, ‘Nietzsche is much nicer about the nobles in the ﬁrst essay than he is about the
slaves’ (Ridley 1998, 128; cf. Ridley 2011, 315; see also Conway 2008, 42–43). Swanton claims that
Nietzsche ‘appears’ to ‘valorize’ nobility, but ‘he valorizes it by comparison with slave morality which
for him is clearly much more dangerous in its tendencies to undermine the development of “higher
man”’ (Swanton 2011, 292). Janaway says, ‘So someone who winces at the description of the nobles
in GM I might also be someone whose reaction is tinged with a kind of admiration or awe’ (Janaway
2009, 101, emphasis added). Janaway is on much better ground when he claims that Nietzsche
wants to elicit ‘an aﬀective inclination in favor of the nobles, to show that one has also inherited
from earlier value systems an excitement and attraction for heroism, prowess, and the exercise of
power with aristocratic disdain’ (Janaway 2009, 105; cf. Owen 2007, 86). For an informative discussion
about some of the key positive features of nobility, see Migotti (2006, 110–113).
INQUIRY 15
of valuation. The propositional content that informs this justiﬁcation,
which is never openly expressed, concerns the fact that modern atheism
is somehow severely problematic – otherwise the noble mode of valua-
tion, which runs counter to modern atheism, would not be so alarmingly
eye-catching. The nobles of antiquity seem powerfully and perhaps even
mysteriously enticing. This should contribute to changing the beliefs of
modern atheists. In the following, ﬁnal section, I want to explore this
issue of belief change in more depth.
Intuition, belief change, and naturalism
There are two rhetorical features of presentational states that help
Nietzsche eﬀect changes of belief, both of which are clearly present in
the ﬁrst essay of GM.26 First, presentational states are non-voluntary.
While we often actively make decisions or judgments, a presentational
state is passive – it simply overtakes us. For instance, we cannot help
reading descriptors like ‘triumphant’, ‘powerful’, ‘passionate’, ‘self-aﬃrma-
tive’, and ‘high-minded’, which Nietzsche uses to describe the nobles, with
a positive valence.
Presentational states are also non-neutral in the sense that they are
compelling. By immediately presenting the world to us as being a
certain way, they tend to dispose us to believe the world is that way.
Readers of GM are disposed to believe that nobility is attractive because
nobility is presented as being attractive. Presentational states function
to rationalize assent to their contents, though of course suﬃcient rational-
ization is a further matter. Finding nobility intuitively appealing impresses
on readers the view that there is reason to believe that nobility is appeal-
ing. Consequently, presentational states move us to embrace certain
beliefs – in this context, beliefs that Nietzsche wants us to accept.
The intuitive appeal of nobility provides the groundwork for modern
atheists to change their beliefs. The non-voluntary, non-neutral provoca-
tions Nietzsche unfurls supply initial reason to ﬁnd nobility appealing,
which in turn works to undercut allegiance to traditional morality. In this
regard, the strategic employment of presentational states can have power-
fully subversive eﬀects.27
26These features, along with others, are explored in greater detail in Bengson (2015).
27The methodological strategy of appealing to intuition also helps makes sense of Nietzsche’s aim
described in the seemingly enigmatic ﬁrst section of the Preface of GM. Nietzsche says, ‘We are
unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves
– how could it happen that we should ever ﬁnd ourselves?’ (GM P: 1). Atheists must be pushed to know
themselves – they must be pressed into understanding what it means fully to embrace atheism – and
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Interestingly, Nietzsche’s use of intuition to change the beliefs of his
readers leads him to adopt certain ways of appealing to intuition which
have actually been used to challenge the use of intuitions in contemporary
philosophy. Experimental philosophers have argued that intuitions can
vary widely between diﬀerent people, groups of people, people at particu-
lar times, and people in diﬀerent contexts.28 Such widespread disagree-
ment seems to erode the reliability of intuition. If intuition reports diﬀer
widely, we might have good reason to suppose that such reports do not
supply tenseless and timeless justiﬁcation, but are instead heavily sensitive
to factors irrelevant to the beliefs that they are employed to justify. Var-
iance is therefore seen as a signiﬁcant problem for the use of intuitions.
Nietzsche is perfectly aware that intuition reports vary across diﬀerent
groups of people, and his knowledge of such variance is exactly the
reason he uses intuition when pursuing his philosophical agenda. For
example, we have seen that he often targets a certain demographic –
modern atheists – who have a particular drive set. The impressions that
Nietzsche hopes to provoke in atheists are meant to manipulate them
into changing their beliefs. Nietzsche is not searching to provide tenseless
and timeless warrant for philosophical positions, like the way intuitions
about Gettier cases have often been used to undermine knowledge as
true justiﬁed belief. Nietzsche looks to provide initial warrant for particular
philosophical positions in order to get particular groups of people to
change their minds. The fact that intuitions vary widely does not sap
their justiﬁcatory force, but in fact contributes to helping Nietzsche
achieve his philosophical aims.29
I have suggested that Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition in order to
supply prima facie justiﬁcation in order to eﬀect changes in belief. One
might argue that philosophical naturalism plays the same role, however,
and does so much better than intuition. After all, naturalistic explanations
seem to be doing all the heavy lifting when it comes to justiﬁcation. Why
think a mental state which merely presents the world to be a certain way
Nietzsche’s appeals to intuition ground this project of discovery. Nietzsche writes, ‘we sometimes rub
our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, “what really was that which we have
just experienced?” and moreover: “who are we really”’ (GM P: 1). Given that the noble mode of valuation
runs against our modern mode, it is obviously disconcerting to have the impression that nobility is
attractive. Nietzsche suggests that atheists should reﬂect on their aﬀective impressions and seek out
who they really are – they are, in fact, still theist in many crucial ways. This seeking is grounded in
the presentational states Nietzsche stirs up.
28See Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001); Knobe and Nichols (2008); Weinberg (2017).
29Gemes (2006, 199–201) gives a nice example of Nietzsche’s use of this strategy in GM. Nietzsche’s pres-
entation of the triumph of slave morality suggests that nineteenth-century Germans are actually quite
Jewish, which, given the cultural climate in Germany at the time, is certainly aimed to unsettle them.
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can do important justiﬁcatory work when we could appeal to a wealth of
sensory information that actually shows the world to be that way?
Nietzsche writes, ‘All credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of
truth come only from the senses’ (BGE 134). It appears that justiﬁcation
comes entirely from sense experience, and thus any eﬀective changes in
belief will essentially turn on naturalistic explanation.
It is important to remember, however, that empirical information plays
a substantial role in what we ﬁnd intuitive.30 For instance, the intuition that
pleasure is not the only good, which might be derived from reading
Nozick’s thought experiment concerning an experience machine, involves
empirical information regarding what pleasure is, what experiences
without pleasure are like, and so on. For Nietzsche, our intuitions involve
all sorts of empirical data, from the ways in which we are driven to
think, feel, and act, to the ways in which the external world inﬂuences
how we think, feel, and act. Intuitions are not divorced from empirical
information, and so they should not be regarded as irrelevant to justiﬁca-
tion. At the same time, Nietzsche thinks intuitions do not provide suﬃcient
justiﬁcation. Presentational states only supply initial reactions and often
contain only implicit content. Given that such states are non-voluntary
and function to rationalize assent to their contents, however, intuitions
can be pivotal for motivating changes in belief, which is undoubtedly
what Nietzsche wants.
As I see things, Nietzsche is not some arch-naturalist who thinks intui-
tions should be banned in philosophy. Rather, he believes that intuitions
should be supplemented and reinforced with the resources the sciences
oﬀer. The propositional content of presentational states, for example, is
open to naturalistic scrutiny. When reading the ﬁrst essay of GM, for
instance, one should have the impression that slave morality is proble-
matic. Nietzsche justiﬁes this naturalistically using a variety of approaches.
One approach involves providing causal explanations that destabilize the
appeal of slave morality by highlighting its negative physiological impact
on humanity. Nietzsche writes that slave morality teaches people to
‘despise’ the ‘instincts of life’ (EH ‘Destiny’ 7, see also A 5, cf. GM II: 24).
Embracing slave morality has devastating consequences for the develop-
ment of the species. Slave morality functions by way of ‘oppressive
instincts that thirst for reprisal’ (GM I: 11). Such desire for revenge concerns
ressentiment, the causal source of the slave mode of valuation, and thus
30Kornblith (2017, 157) also makes this point, and, importantly, he does so when arguing for a naturalistic
philosophical methodology.
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the origin of modern morality. Ressentiment emerges as ‘submerged
hatred, the vengefulness of the impotent’ (GM I: 10). Nietzsche contrasts
this negativity with the noble mode of valuation: ‘Ressentiment itself, if
it should appear in the noble man […] does not poison’ (GM I: 10).
Nietzsche even exclaims, ‘How much reverence has a noble man for his
enemies! – and such reverence is a bridge to love’ (GM I: 10). Nietzsche’s
methodological strategy in the ﬁrst essay of GM involves providing natur-
alistic explanations of the development and application of certain psycho-
logical mechanisms, and these explanations work to provide a defense of
the impressions about slave morality and nobility one receives when
reading GM.
Naturalistic explanations can therefore complement Nietzsche’s
appeals to intuition by providing substantive justiﬁcation for views that
gain initial plausibility by way of intuition. For Nietzsche, I have argued,
intuitive states have rhetorical force, but they are not strictly non-rational.
Indeed, as we have just seen, they contain propositional content which
oﬀers prima facie warrant which can be analyzed by rational means. Pre-
sentational states and aﬀective orientations implicitly present the world
to us as being a certain way, and whether the world is the way it is pre-
sented can be, at least in principle, examined naturalistically. This distinc-
tive way of using intuition therefore services both the naturalistic
Nietzsche and the rhetorical Nietzsche.
Summary and conclusion
I have argued that appeals to intuition are consistent with Nietzsche’s
philosophical naturalism, speciﬁcally ﬁxing belief by way of scientiﬁc
method, insofar as intuitions do not merely reinforce previously endorsed
beliefs, but instead simply provide initial evidence for positions that could
be either overturned or fortiﬁed with future investigation. Moreover,
although Nietzsche suggests that intuitions should be rejected because
they provide no independent support for positions philosophers are
driven to accept, I have argued that the aﬀective reactions manifest in pre-
sentational states can reveal the nature of some of our key drives, which
can provide reason for us to question, reject, reinforce, or modify what
we are driven to believe. In fact, altering what we are typically driven to
believe is the reason Nietzsche uses intuition – after all, he thinks that
what we typically believe is problematic. Appeals to intuition can provide
prima facie epistemic justiﬁcation for views that he believes are correct,
and the fact that presentational states are typically aﬀectively-loaded,
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immediate, non-neutral, and contain content which is open to naturalistic
scrutiny renders them well-suited to ground the formation of new beliefs.
This way of understanding intuition provides a helpful new way of under-
standing how Nietzsche does philosophy.
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